Hizbullah Iran Lebanon Qasem Soleimani Syria tech

The Iranian Conquest of Syria

Map showing sites of Israeli attacks in 2018 in the Quneitra province

Hizbullah has succeeded in establishing 4 permanent coaching bases, which additionally function ammunition depots, and brief and medium-range missile bases, three of which are in Daraa and the fourth in the area of Quneitra:

  • Haql Karim al Shimali, established in early 2019 within the Ledja lava fields northeast of Daraa and in proximity to a village bearing the identical identify; Ayb base established in September 2018 in the same Ledja space in the deployment area of the Ninth and Fifth Syrian divisions.

  • Ayb base was built after a number of villages have been “emptied” of their inhabitants underneath the pretext that they served ISIS as a refuge.

  • The 52nd Syrian Brigade close to Al Haraq (east of Daraa) also serves as a base for Hizbullah after the withdrawal of Hizbullah fighters from the Lebanese-Syrian border towns of Zabadani.

    Map showing sites of Israeli attacks in 2018 in the Quneitra provinceIDF Spokesperson’s map displaying sites of Israeli attacks in 2018 in the Quneitra province.

  • The fourth base, Al Hadr, was inaugurated with a excessive profile in October 2018. The bottom, referred to as “the Golan Unit,” is reportedly situated in one of many corporations of the 90th Syrian Brigade deployed between Hadr and Harfa north of Quneitra. In response to reviews, this base serves primarily as an intelligence gathering and eavesdropping outpost. The bottom is protected by a unit referred to as “the Quneitra Hawks Brigade” (Liwa’ Suqur Quneitra) which assures its logistical link from the Al Sayyeda Zaynab shrine space close to Damascus and the ‘Arna area and the Hermon mountain (Jabal El Sheikh) west of Damascus.Hizbullah presence shouldn’t be limited to the four mentioned bases.

Hizbullah instructions 5 Shiite militias within the Golan space, each numbering a number of thousand fighters, and has been busy getting ready a army choice towards Israel because the restoration of the southern provinces of Syria in case of a surge of hostilities between Israel, Iran, the Syrian regime, and Hizbullah. This deployment in the area dealing with Israel in the Golan offers Iran (and Hizbullah) the power to open a second front. That is the rationale behind Hizbullah’s drive to infiltrate the whole area, extending from the Israeli border eastwards and the Jordanian border northwards to such an extent that Hizbullah fighters have been spotted in virtually all of the cities and villages of the world.

Hizbullah has been testing Israel’s response. Encouraged by a scarcity of response each from Israel and Russia, Hizbullah has been inching forward on the Quneitra perimeter and gaining new territory. Unprecedented until now, in June 2019, new positions manned by Hizbullah Lebanese fighters have been deployed adjoining to the Israeli strains. These embrace positions in Tellet Aldrai’at and Tellet Al Mahir in the vicinity of the two small villages of Rafid and El ‘Isha, approximately 200 meters from the UNDOF checkpoint, controlling the central access from the Israeli Golan by way of Quneitra and from there to the primary freeway to Damascus.

Hizbullah’s Army Actions Are Diversified

  • Hizbullah’s actions prolong from getting ready the ground and the operational plans for a potential conflict with Israel to stockpiling weapons and missiles to be used in time of struggle. Hizbullah has acquired mid-range missiles, some of them mounted on designated vans, anti-tank weaponry, drone capabilities, and new anti-aircraft and anti-naval weapons.

  • Hizbullah has been the supplier of manpower to guard strategic and sensitive installations. Such an intelligence outpost is Tel El Harra, a strategic army place 20 kilometers from the Israeli border, which overlooks Daraa, Quneitra, and the primary highway from Daraa to Damascus. The outpost was the goal of attacks attributed to Israel.

    Tel al HarraTel al HarraTel al Harra overlooking the Golan, website of Iranian listening publish (Wikimedia, credit score Mati Shaller)IDF airstrike in SyriaIDF airstrike in SyriaIDF airstrike in Syria within the Tel al Harra space, June 2019. (IDF Spokesperson’s Unit)

    Initially built as an intelligence-monitoring middle dealing with Israel, this outpost was a joint base for both the Syrian intelligence and the Russian Ministry of Protection. Till its fall into palms of the rebels in 2013, Tel el Hara was the deployment area of the 121st Mechanized Brigade, belonging to the Seventh Division.

    In November 2018, Iran deployed a radar station on the japanese slopes of Tel al Harra and inaugurated an eavesdropping outpost manned by personnel belonging to the Revolutionary Guards.

  • One in every of Hizbullah’s prime priorities is to enlist new recruits to its ranks from the local inhabitants (within the Ledja area the recruits come principally from Bedouin tribes in search of to be employed for $250 U.S. dollars per 30 days plus a bonus of the identical amount in case of a profitable operation). Courses are held four occasions a yr and last from a couple of days to several weeks. The anti-tank weaponry course lasts 25 days, infantry 15 days, engineers 20 days, and 40 days for the particular assassination process drive referred to as the “Zair” group.

  • A number of the programs are instructed in the area while others are held in Hizbullah’s Lebanese amenities. Those programs purpose to infuse these recruits with the ideological tenets of Hizbullah and its Iran patron, instructing them within the handling and operation of various weapon techniques (including missiles), building new preventing formations (primarily manned by paid Shiite mercenaries), assassination squads, and special forces. All instruction is beneath the supervision of a Hizbullah operative, Hassan Mansour Al Ruweydan, a Syrian citizen from the Al Massiqa village in the Ledja space.

    The induction process is as follows: new recruits from the Ledja-Daraa-Suweyda areas are gathered in specified teams and transported to the japanese a part of the territory where they meet Ghayth Maleq, a Lebanese whose mission is to register all recruits. As quickly as the registration process is ended, the recruits are sent to the village of Ayb where Hizbullah has established a permanent presence. There, the groups are separated in clusters of six individuals underneath the command of a Hizbullah teacher and introduced to the commander of the camp – a Lebanese member of Hizbullah nicknamed “Abu Wahid.”

  • Hizbullah has been conducting intelligence actions, together with the gathering of data on the Israeli aspect and eavesdropping, patrolling the primary axis within the Syrian Golan, building an infrastructure that may halt or sluggish Israel’s eventual incursion in the direction of the Syrian hinterland. All that is in preparation for a potential clash with Israeli forces and a prelude to the institution of a front dealing with Israel in addition to the already ready grounds of South Lebanon.

Battle of Curiosity with Russia, Mutual Targeted Killings, and Financial Competition

The potential of army escalation between Israel and the pro-Iranian forces and the danger ensuing to the steadiness of the Assad regime brought Moscow to broker an arrangement with Tehran based on which Iran would remove its proxies to an area 100 kilometers from the Israeli border (actually, the withdrawal was inside the 80-kilometer limit). Russia would deploy checkpoints at very particular places to serve as a buffer between Israel and the pro-Iranian proxies.

Nevertheless, because of the permanent infiltration efforts carried out by Iran and Hizbullah, a very unique state of affairs has unfolded on the bottom. Hizbullah and pro-Iranian proxies’ checkpoints, coordinated by the regime’s Fourth Division deployed in the area, have been erected virtually adjoining to the Russian checkpoints. Pro-Iranian patrols have been patrolling the world in the very same axis patrolled by the Russians. In consequence, frictions between the Russian and the pro-Iranian proxies occur now and again, creating tensions between Moscow and Tehran.

Moreover, as a consequence of that friction, local leaders supported by Russia and local chiefs of pro-Iranian militias have been conducting mutual targeted killings. This has increased the strain between the Russian forces on the bottom, part of the Fifth Russian Corps deployed in Syria, and the pro-Iranian militias backed by the Syrian Air Pressure Intelligence and the Fourth Armored Division (which additionally consists of parts of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards) deployed within the space.

The checkpoints have turn out to be the primary challenge between the Russian-sponsored local militias and the pro-Iranian proxies. The latter, camouflaged in Syrian army fatigues and waving the Syrian flag, have tried to determine checkpoints and deploy Hizbullah and Revolutionary Guards parts within the neighborhood of the Jordanian-Israeli-Syrian border area (often known as the Yarmouk basin). Parts belonging to the Russian Fifth Corps, together with the Russian Army Police liable for operating the checkpoints, have waged armed assaults to dislodge them and push them back beyond the Ledja volcanic lava space, northeast of Daraa. Most fascinating was the establishment by the Russians of an area armed militia headed by Imad Abu Zarik, a former commander of a formation referred to as Jaysh al Thawra (the Revolution Army) whose mission is to defend the border towns adjacent to the Jordanian border. The Russians ordered Zarik to take away all road portraits of Bashar Assad and his father at the Nasib border crossing level (dealing with Jordan) to stop the pro-Iranian militias from establishing their presence there.

The removal of an Assad portrait at the Nasib border crossing to JordanThe removal of an Assad portrait at the Nasib border crossing to JordanThe removing of an Assad portrait at the Nasib border crossing to Jordan.

Cutthroat Economic Confrontation

The strain between Iran and Russia shouldn’t be limited to the army deployment of each of its protégés and proxies. The actual conflict resides within the ruthless race for the acquisition of post-civil struggle exclusive financial benefits derived from the reconstruction process that Syria supposedly will bear within the close to future.6

Yahya Rahim Safavi, army adviser to Iranian Supreme Chief and past commander of the Revolutionary Guards, stated that Iran was striving to strengthen its financial relations with Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, parallel to their army and political cooperation.7 The “jewel in the crown” of the quadruple Shi’ite axis would be the development of a railway from Iran by means of Iraq and Syria to the Mediterranean Sea. This enterprise will strengthen the economic ties between these nations and provide them with strategic depth. There’s also a spiritual tourism facet in the plan, with the “Shi’ite Practice” bringing plenty of Iranian pilgrims to the Shi’ite holy websites in Iraq and Syria.eight

Hossein Selahvarzi, Vice-Chair of the Iranian Chambers of Commerce and Business, declared in August 2017 Iran’s want to advance tasks for the event and rehabilitation of Syria using Iranian corporations. Selahvarzi addressed the Syrian authorities to advertise free trade agreements between the two nations to facilitate the method of Syria’s rehabilitation.9

Syrian Electrical energy minister, Mohammad Zuhair Kharboutli, who visited Tehran in September 2017, signed agreements to import five power crops from Iran to rehabilitate the facility sector in Syria. On the agenda is the signing of further contracts in excess of half a billion Euros.10

In a consortium with Venezuelan and Syrian corporations, Iran announced its plans to construct a refinery in Syria near Homs, with an preliminary production capacity of 70,000 barrels of oil per day.11 On the second stage, the production fee will improve to 140,000 barrels of oil a day. Iran also introduced that it might rehabilitate two further refineries in Syria. Iran’s intention is to make use of Syrian crude oil, which the Iranians would refine.12

 In January 2019, Iran and Syria signed nine agreements for Syria’s railroad reconstruction, funding, financing and money laundering, schooling and tradition and “combating terrorism.” So as to add insult to Russian damage, Iran was granted the exclusive rights of working the Latakia port allowing for the primary time a direct foothold of Iran on the Mediterranean, in close neighborhood of Russia’s naval bases in Tartus and Latakia.

Latakia and Tartus ports in SyriaLatakia and Tartus ports in SyriaLatakia and Tartus ports in Syria. Is Iran encroaching on Russian bases?

Moreover, Syria is meant to lease to Iran 5,000 hectares of land for farming and to offer land for animal husbandry in addition to another 1,000 hectares for developing oil and fuel terminals. [1 hectare = 2.5 acres.] These agreements come after another collection of exclusive rights bestowed by the Syrian regime on Iran, corresponding to investment in Syrian phosphates within the japanese part of Syria near the historic city of Palmyra the place, in accordance with Syrian statistics, the world has the world’s largest phosphate reserves.13

Russia expressed its anger over Syria’s granting of unprecedented economic advantages to Iran. Russia’s reaction was acquired in Damascus and, in consequence, Moscow was also granted rights to take a position and exploit phosphates. Moscow intervened once more when the Syrian regime was about to grant a consortium backed by Iran’s Revolutionary Guards the concession to operate mobile phone providers alongside Syria’s Syriatel and MTN corporations.

There isn’t a doubt that of all of the agreements signed by Syria and Iran, the agreement on the Latakia seaport carries with it dire consequences regionally. Should the agreement enter into impact, this might open the door for the Iranian alliance stretching from Iran-Iraq-Syria and the Mediterranean to secure a army and financial route that might solely serve Iranian interests.

Iran’s Social Activities

Tehran has had political ambitions regarding Syria for years and has indeed invested appreciable assets in converting Syria into a Shiite state. The process started in the course of the rule of Hafez Assad when a far-reaching network was created of instructional, cultural, and non secular institutions throughout Syria; it was further expanded throughout Bashar’s reign. The goal was to advertise the Shiization of all regions of the Syrian state. The Syrian regime let Iranian missionaries work freely to strengthen the Shiite faith in Damascus and the cities of the Alawite coast, as well as the smaller towns and villages. A area research by the European Union in the first half of 2006 discovered that probably the most vital proportion of spiritual conversions to Shiism occurred in areas with an Alawite majority.14

In each urban and rural elements of Syria, Sunnis and others who adopted the Shiite religion acquired privileges and preferential remedy within the disbursement of Iranian assist money. The heads of the tribes in the Raqqa area have been invited by the Iranian ambassador in Damascus to visit Iran cost-free, and the Iranians doled out funds to the poor and monetary loans to merchants who have been by no means required to pay them back.15 

The size of the Iranian investment in Raqqa, which included elegant public buildings, mosques, and husainiyyas (worshippers’ halls specially designed by the Shi’a Muslim creed to serve as a spot for the celebration of ceremonies, a place of gathering and hearing sermons – either political or spiritual), have been just lately revealed by Sunni rebels who took over the remote town and destroyed, plundered, and eliminated all signs of the Iranian and Shiite presence there.16 As of 2009, there were over 500 husainiyyas in Syria present process Iranian renovation work. In Damascus itself, the Iranians invested substantial sums to regulate the Shiite holy locations including the tomb of Sayyida Zaynab, the shrine of Sayyida Ruqayya, and the shrine of Sayyida Sukayna. These websites appeal to Iranian tourism, which grew from 27,000 guests in 1978 to 200,000 in 2003.17

The mosque and tomb of ZaynabThe mosque and tomb of ZaynabThe mosque and tomb of Zaynab, daughter of Ali and granddaughter of Mohammed, situated in a Damascus suburb. (Wikipedia)

Iran additionally operates a cultural middle in Damascus that it considers one among its most essential and successful.18 This middle publishes works in Arabic, holds biweekly cultural occasions, and conducts seminars and conferences aimed toward enhancing the Iranian cultural influence in the nation. The Iranian cultural middle can also be chargeable for the propagation and research of the Persian language in Syrian universities, together with offering academics of Persian.

Syria’s ethnic variety within the southern part of the nation has been a challenge to Iran’s drive to penetrate the world and establish its presence and influence. To beat this impediment, Iran has financed the institution of a so-called research institute headed by an area collaborator, a former rebel commander Hussam Fneichar, a man of dubious popularity. The institute’s main objective and aim are to gather info on the whereabouts of opposition parts in the area, their activities, and all relevant info to be used in time of need (resembling telephone numbers, addresses, relations, cousins, broader households, and social affiliations). All info gathered is duly coordinated with officers belonging to a formation referred to as Al Quwwat Al Radifa (the Radifa Forces), part of the Fourth Armored Division, earlier than being processed and carried out on the ground towards the designated opposition members.

Most spectacular, nevertheless, is the social actions initiated by Iran meant to widen its viewers and followers in Syria by spreading the Shiite ideology. Iran has been lively in establishing non-profit organizations to renovate and typically reconstruct husainiyyas, helping the poor and promoting Iran’s position among the many revered Shi’a Sheikhs in the Daraa and Quneitra provinces.

A special envoy sent by Khamenei, the Iranian Supreme Chief, visited the city of Daraa firstly of 2019 and met with representatives of the regime and the population, discussing ways of aiding the population within the area. The envoy provided providers both instantly or by means of the totally different municipalities of the Daraa department, reminiscent of organizing spiritual courses for the youngsters of Da’el and Al Harraq. Probably the most influential non-profit organizations in the Daraa province are Al Zahraa and Al Bustan organizations, the latter having its major workplace in the village of Khan Arnabeh on the Syrian plateau dealing with Israel and intimately coordinated with the Golan regiment (Fawj el Jolane) and the Baath celebration militias. This exercise just isn’t limited to the southern region of Syria however encompasses the Syrian territory utterly, as far east as the Deir el Zor region.

In response to studies, Iran even initiated the institution of a political social gathering referred to as the “Individuals’s Celebration” (Hizb el Sha’ab) headed by ‘Abd el ‘Aziz Trad Al Milhem, recognized for his pro-Iranian affiliations. The get together opened workplaces within the town of Quneitra and has enlisted 450 members.

Iran has established 38 NGOs and non-profit organizations everywhere in the Syrian territory, which function a way to spread Iranian influence and hegemony in areas thought-about to be of important interest to Iran. These organizations are to be found in Aleppo, Homs, Damascus, Daraa, Deir el Zor, Latakia, Hama, and Quneitra and serve Iran’s coverage of long-term presence in Syria. They’re an alternative to the Syrian regime’s failing organs meant to help and provide providers to the population in the fields of power, health, and meals provide. They participate by means of straw corporations within the very profitable market of reconstruction of Syria’s destroyed infrastructures. All these organizations are dedicated to aiding the local Shiite inhabitants. A few of those organizations depend on native collaborators while others, such as the Al Zahraa NGO lively within the small city of Al Yaduda, are linked on to the private envoy of Iran Supreme Information Khamenei in Syria.

The examples referring to the actions of those charitable organizations are assorted. The Lebanese Jihad Al Banna’ (Constructive Jihad) non-profit organization is an offshoot of Lebanon’s Hizbullah and was instrumental in rebuilding the tutorial amenities in a Shiite majority populated city of Nabbal within the Aleppo province. It additionally constructed new healthcare amenities in that town, whereas in Deir el Zor, the same organization offered food for the livestock at half the market worth.

In accordance with reliable sources, Iran’s “charitable” organizations are unfold in Syria as follows:

  • Damascus area: Al-Lajna al-Khayriyyah Al Ijtima’iah (The Social Charitable Committee); Al-Zahraa’ Charitable Organization; Jihad Al Banna’ (Constructive Jihad); Mu’ssasst Al Amin Al Ijtima’iyah (The Amin Social Institution); Majma’ Al Sarat Al Thaqafi (The Prayer Instructional Group); Al Rahmat Al Khayriyah (Al Rahmat Charitable Organization); Mu’assassat al Imam Al Sajed (Imam Al Sajed Institution); Mu’assassat Al Shuhada’ (The Martyrs’ Association).

  • Deir El Zor: Al Thaklin Al Khayriyyah (Al Thaklin Charitable Organization); Jihad Al Banna’(Constructive Jihad).

  • Latakia: Al Thaklin Al Khayriyyah (Al Thaklin Charitable Organization).

  • Hama: Al Thaklin Al Khayriyyah (Al Thaklin Charitable Group).

  • Aleppo: Al Thaklin Al Khayriyyah (Al Thaklin Charitable Organization); Mu’assassat Al Shuhada’ (The Martyrs’ Association); Jihad Al Banna’(Constructive Jihad); Markaz Nour El Hada al Thaqafi (Nour El Hada Instructional Middle); Utlub El ‘Ilm (Ask for Information); Ihsan El Khayriyah (Ihsan Charitable); Majma’ al Hijja (Al Hijja Association); M’ahad Al Qalam Al T’alimi (Al Qalam Instructional Institute).

  • Homs: Al Ghadir; Al Mostafa Al Khayriyah (Al Mostafa Charitable); Idara Al Markaziyah Fi Homs (The Central Administration in Homs); Mu’assassat Al Shuhada’ (The Martyrs’ Affiliation); Jam’iyat Al Hadi Al Khayriyah (Al Hadi Charitable Organization); Jam’iyat Al Zarzuriyah (Al Zarzuriya Association); Al Thaklin Al Khayriyyah (Al Thaklin Charitable Group).

Ethnic Cleaning

Probably the most troubling Iranian/Hizbullah activity in Syria as an entire, and within the Golan area dealing with Israel and Jordan, particularly, is the ethnic cleaning Iran is initiating with the lively assistance of Hizbullah Lebanon. As reported earlier in this article, Hizbullah destroyed no less than eight Syrian villages to construct its Ayb Base. In a special twist, within the space referred to as “the Demise Triangle” (Muthallath Al Mawt) a small village named Karyat Deir Makr, west of Damascus, has develop into the leading website where Hizbullah’s households dwell after having expelled the native inhabitants and brought possession of their houses, buildings, and flats. Furthermore, in accordance with sources, Hizbullah has embarked on a shopping for spree of agricultural land and real property near the Jordanian-Syrian border utilizing “straw males,” destined to be used by Hizbullah militias for future dwelling functions. Hizbullah has been cooperating in that exact area with an area collaborator named “Abu Qasem,” a member of the Ja’afar household in the Suweyda space.

This phenomenon isn’t restricted to southern Syrian. The Syrian regime itself has been cooperating instantly with the Iranian policy of ethnic cleaning by implementing a harsh policy of vetting Syrian refugees who’ve applied to return to their unique houses. The method is so difficult and has been the subject of a confrontation with the Russian Authorities, which had brokered an arrangement permitting the return of Syrian refugees to their houses. Hizbullah opposition was such that in consequence, only a few thousand Syrian refugees (out of greater than one million and a half refugees in Lebanon) have been capable of return to Syria. Sunni residents of conquered towns, which have been the scene of bloody battles between the regime and the rebels who had left the town and lived as displaced refugees, such as the inhabitants of the city of Al-Qusayr, have been forbidden to return to their destroyed houses. These displaced individuals dwelling within the Homs space and north of Damascus have been barred from returning to Al-Qusayr and provided to reside in other towns corresponding to Homs. Greater than 60 % of the city space in Al-Qusayr has been destroyed through the battles and what was left was given to members of the regime’s notorious militia (“Al-Shabiha”). Hizbullah has been promoting all agricultural land belonging to Al Qusayr and, in line with some sources, Hizbullah has minimize down all the timber within the city and its space and bought them as timber for heating. These days, Hizbullah has been constructing new fortifications across the city, primarily on the Al Dab’aa army airbase. Nevertheless, Christian households whose members have been part of the “Shabiha” militia within the area and fought with the Hizbullah models towards the rebels have been allowed to return to Al Qusayr.

This fate has not been solely the fortune of the inhabitants of Al Qusayr. Dozens of Sunni families have been forbidden by Hizbullah to return to the town of Maaloula in the Qalamoun area bordering Lebanon, which fell to Hizbullah in the summer of 2014, beneath the pretext that they had cooperated with Jabhat al Nusra jihadist organization. Hizbullah even razed to the ground dozens of homes by setting them on hearth, together with a number of the mosques, whereas forbidding holding prayers in and round them. Hizbullah established army garrisons in and round Maaloula. The remaining empty houses have been distributed among the Hizbullah fighters’ families present in the space. As in the case of Al Qusayr, here once more, Christians have been allowed to return to the ghost towns and conduct their spiritual ceremonies. Hizbullah provided an alternative choice to the Sunni inhabitants of Maaloula – enlist in Hizbullah ranks or lose their property to the good thing about Hizbullah fighters.

MaaloulaMaaloulaThe as soon as predominantly Christian – and Aramaic-speaking – town of Maaloula. (Wikipedia, Erik Albers, 2007)

Conclusion

Despite all Israeli efforts to include, forestall, and dislodge Iranian proxies and Iranian troops from building a entrance dealing with Israel in the Golan, Iran and its proxies with Hizbullah leadership have succeeded in infiltrating the world and making a fait accompli Israel can’t ignore. The Iranian proxies must be posted at the very least 80 kilometers from the Israeli border, but they’re present at the very doorsteps of the Golan, nonetheless undercover and in modest formations. Should Iran continue with no intervention from Russia and Israel, then the process of consolidation would grow to be quicker, and the menace to Israel can be rather more acute.

Furthermore, a very unusual state of affairs is unfolding in Syria, and that is full submission to Iranian efforts to “Iranize” Syria utilizing army presence, financial affect, and social and non secular actions. The truth that more than five million refugees have not been granted the correct to return to their houses is as a result of the last word objective is to recreate Syria. The objective is to reshape the state where the Alawites, a minority as soon as representing 15 % of the population, have grown in proportion and consolidated their chokehold on Syria, changing the political and demographic actuality of what was Syria.

Amputated from its northwestern province of Idlib by Turkey, a province which is undergoing a strategy of “Turkification” and deprived from its northeastern area by the U.S.- protected Kurds, Bashar Assad has no different selection but to rely solely on his allies and saviors, Russia and Iran, each of which demand to fulfill their political appetite in return. Bashar Assad’s unstable and shaky regime has no selection but to rely on the Iranian and Russian bayonets. The worth Assad has to pay is clear and is accepted as a result of it carries with it an unprecedented rewarding policy – by relinquishing parts of Syria’s independence he receives in return full recognition and legitimization of the Alawite regime.

This can be a elementary change within the Center East ethnic fiber original by the Iranian Ayatollah regime: the consolidation of a Shiite belt extending from Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen with potential ramifications in japanese Saudi Arabia and Bahrain.

* * *

Notes